Competing to deliver? Political workers and service delivery in Pakistan by Cheema, Ali et al.
RESEARCH BRIEFING
OCTOBER 2017
Ali Cheema,1 Shandana Khan Mohmand2 and Asad Liaqat3
IDS_Master Logo
Competing to deliver? 
Political workers and 
service delivery in 
Pakistan
RESEARCH 
BRIEFING Competing to deliver? Political workers and service delivery in Pakistan
2
Key themes
• Service delivery
• Responsiveness
• Political parties
• Political accountability
Box 1. Research design and methods
Our research examined the relationship between the unequal provision of functional municipal services 
and political competition among elected politicians and political party workers. To achieve this, we used 
a carefully constructed research design.
• We selected a mix of competitive and non-competitive national assembly (NA) constituencies 
that directly border each other in Lahore’s city centre: NA-121, NA-122 and NA-124. Of the 13 
constituencies in Lahore, NA-122 was the second-most closely contested in the 2013 general 
elections – PTI lost this seat by a vote margin of less than 5% – while NA-121 was the fifth-most 
closely contested, and NA-124 was the second-least competitive. This sampling design allowed 
us to examine the association between service delivery and electoral competition faced by elected 
representatives.
• Within these constituencies, we worked in four provincial assembly constituencies. Following the 
2013 election, PTI holds the provincial seat in two constituencies (147 and 148) and PML-N holds 
the seat in the other two (146 and 149). 
• We surveyed all 43 union councils4 that fall completely within these provincial assembly 
constituencies, excluding two union councils that are composed primarily of elite government or 
private housing societies. 
• We recorded the number of party workers present in each union council, and the political 
parties that they represent. Political party leaders rely on party workers to organise votes in 
neighbourhoods and communities during elections, and to aggregate and convey citizen demands. 
We were thus able to examine the association between service delivery and competition at the level 
of party workers. 
• Our data came from a survey of 2,127 randomly selected adults of voting age in these 43 union 
councils, and from about 40 interviews with local party workers. The survey asked respondents 
about their access to important government-provided municipal services.5 The quality of these 
services and the channels they use to articulate their demand for these services.
Why do some citizens receive better municipal 
services than others?
Comparative political economy is deeply 
concerned with this question, but most 
answers so far suggest that unequal access to 
these services is determined by either class 
or partisan voting. Our research in Pakistan 
found that the unequal provision of functional 
municipal services is a particular challenge in 
the central neighbourhoods of megacities in 
emerging democracies. 
What explains this trend? The difference in 
urban citizens’ access to services in Lahore 
appears to be linked to the density of party 
worker networks at the local level, and to 
levels of electoral competition faced by 
political representatives. This is an important 
finding for policy purposes because it 
establishes the intrinsic value of multiparty 
competition, which, in and of itself, can 
make politicians more responsive to citizens’ 
demands for the provision of services, even 
when institutions are weak. These findings 
suggest that improvements to service 
delivery will require institutional reforms that 
strengthen channels of political accountability 
at the local level.
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Why do citizens in urban 
centres have uneven access 
to municipal services? 
The rapid growth of the population of Lahore, 
Pakistan's second biggest city, has resulted in a 
substantial increase in the demand for municipal 
services. And, as in many megacities worldwide, 
the government has failed to keep up. Providing 
all of the city’s 11 million residents with functional 
municipal services remains a major challenge for 
the state. 
Yet Lahore is the capital of Punjab province, and 
home to the top leaders in Pakistan’s two largest 
parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), 
known as PML-N, the party in government both at 
the national level and in the province, and Pakistan 
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), its main opponent at both 
levels. Despite Lahore’s political importance, there 
is considerable variation in access to government-
provided functional municipal services. 
Why do some citizens in megacities such as Lahore 
receive access to functional municipal services, 
when others do not? Comparative political economy 
is deeply concerned with this question, but most 
answers so far suggest that unequal access to 
services is determined either by class – richer 
citizens get more and better services than poorer 
citizens – or by partisan voting, in which those 
constituencies that support the ruling party get 
better service provision. 
However, most studies on unequal access to 
public service provision in developing country 
cities have focused on service provision in urban 
informal settlements or slums. They have tended to 
ignore the question of unequal provision in formal 
settlements or central urban neighbourhoods. How 
big is the issue of access to functional services in 
these neighbourhoods? What is the logic behind 
the targeting of services here?
The extent of uneven service 
provision in central urban 
neighbourhoods  
Our expectation was that these residents should 
enjoy similar levels and quality of municipal 
services, but we found that this was not the case, 
as the following graphs demonstrate.  
Dysfunctional services are widespread 
across neighbourhoods, poorest 
residents worst affected
The quality of the government services provided 
remains a real challenge for many in Lahore’s 
central neighbourhoods. The majority of our 
survey respondents (56.4%) reported having 
access to only moderately functional services, 
while a further 32.1% reported having access 
to dysfunctional government services. Figure 1 
shows that most of those reporting dysfunctional 
services are in the bottom 40% of the expenditure 
distribution. But residents across all quintiles 
receive services of variable quality: even within 
the richest quintile, over a quarter of respondents 
(26.5%) reported being provided with poor-
quality services. 
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Figure 1.  Residents with dysfunctional municipal services, by expenditure quintile 
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Improvements in services are variable
We asked residents if the quality of municipal 
services provided by government had improved 
between the 2013 election and the time of our 
survey (February–March 2017).6 Figure 2, which 
shows residents’ perception of improvements, 
highlights the considerable variation in this. Over 
half of all respondents (55.3%) said there had 
been no change, 26% said these had improved, 
while 18.6% said they had worsened.
These three figures demonstrate that some 
residents of Lahore, who live in the heart of a 
city that is home to much of the province’s main 
development infrastructure and is a centre of 
political power, receive adequate levels of quality 
municipal services, while others in the same city 
do not. The next question for our research was: 
why is this the case?
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Who is responding to citizens’ needs?
Which intermediary channels are in place to 
respond to citizens’ demands for municipal 
services? The main channels can be direct between 
citizens and the providers of municipal services – 
referred to as the ‘short route’ (World Bank 2003) 
– or indirect, where intermediation is done by 
political actors, i.e. the ‘long route’ (Ibid.). 
During our survey, we asked respondents who 
reported an improvement in service delivery 
between 2013 and 2017 to identify the actors 
responsible for this. The responses, shown in 
Figure 3, suggest that in the areas we studied, 
politicians (national and provincial) and local 
party workers are the main drivers for improving 
Figure 2.  Perceived improvements in the quality of services provided
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Figure 3.  Actors responsible for the improvement in municipal service provision during 2013–2017,  
     as perceived by survey respondents
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municipal services, rather than, for example, 
state departments, civic organisations or users’ 
associations. This suggests that the ‘long route’ 
is the main channel for improvements, and that 
politicians and political party workers are central 
to the provision of municipal services.
It is possible, therefore, that the puzzle of uneven 
access to functional municipal services has much 
to do with the conditions that make politicians and 
their party workers responsive to the needs of citizens 
within certain communities and neighbourhoods. So, 
under which conditions are politicians responsive to 
voter needs and preferences? 
Literature on this subject (Khemani, Dal Bó, Ferraz, 
Finan and Stephenson, with Odugbemi, Thapa and 
Abrahams 2016; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Stokes 2006; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999) 
tells us that politicians’ behaviour is conditioned by 
competition. But what kind of competition matters for 
service delivery? Is it competition between politicians 
competing for electoral seats at the national and 
provincial levels that matters, or is it localised 
competition between the party workers who work 
with voters on a daily basis?
Unpacking the logic of 
political targeting
Our research found that there is a greater 
improvement in service delivery in areas where a 
higher number of party workers are present in a union 
council, and where there is a more equal distribution 
across different competing parties. In other words, 
the density of party worker networks, and the political 
competition across local party workers, influence 
service delivery: where there are more party workers 
and greater competition between them, service 
delivery is more likely to improve.7  
We found that service delivery is even more likely 
to improve when national- and provincial-level 
electoral constituency politics are also competitive 
(measured as the margin by which the winning party 
/ candidate won their national or provincial assembly 
seat). Further, improvements in service provision are 
more likely to take place where competition between 
national and provincial politicians is combined with 
localised competition. 
At the same time, we found that when there are 
few formal incentives for making service delivery 
more responsive in weakly institutionalised political 
systems such as that in Pakistan, competition 
between local workers seems to be a good device for 
keeping politicians disciplined. Our research suggests 
that competing local party workers create pressure 
on politicians to deliver in terms of service delivery, 
and that these pressures are communicated upwards 
through party machines. These pressures matter 
more if national politicians are actively competing 
with their opponents for local votes. 
We explored these mechanisms in more detail in 
two union councils that lie close to one another, in 
order to better understand how the structure of party 
organisational networks – in particular, partisan 
competition between local party workers – leads to 
better service delivery. Both union councils had a 
comparable level of service provision in 2013, but 
by the time of our survey in 2017, conditions in one 
had stayed largely the same, while the other had 
registered a significant improvement in citizens’ 
perception of the delivery and quality of municipal 
services. Interestingly, the two councils had very 
different numbers of political party workers and a 
different partisan balance. The one with greater 
improvements had more party workers and more 
intense political competition between them.
Interviews with party workers in these two union 
councils allowed us to explore in greater detail how the 
relationship between party organisational networks, 
partisan competition and service delivery works. 
When there are more party workers operating within 
communities on a daily basis (e.g. communicating with 
citizens, collating their demands, and transmitting 
these upwards), there is a greater chance that citizens’ 
demands will reach politicians. When these party 
workers operate within a competitive environment – in 
which brokers associated with different parties are 
actively performing the same functions within the 
community – the transmission of demands becomes 
even more efficient. And when the higher-tier 
politicians receiving these messages are themselves 
actively competing with rivals who they are only likely 
to beat by small margins, their propensity to respond 
to the demands emanating from the local party 
machine is greater. 
At the same time, politicians in tight contests may 
also put more pressure on their local party workers to 
perform better. This, combined with the pressure from 
local competitors from other parties, keeps the links 
between party operatives and politicians active, and 
motivates workers to foster and maintain their own 
contacts with government departments in order to 
resolve emerging issues quickly. Added to this is the 
desire to build personal reputations in the process, 
which can help local workers to grab the party’s 
attention when the time comes to nominate party 
candidates for local government elections. 
More party workers operating within a locally 
competitive environment thus means that 
voters have a larger number of channels for 
communication and interaction with politicians 
and government departments. The density of 
political party workers at the local level underpins 
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politicians’ responsiveness to voters, and it is 
a combination of competition among elected 
politicians and local party workers that matters for 
service delivery.
Policy implications
Emerging democracies like Pakistan8 – where 
political parties are internally weak and dependent 
on the power, influence and resources of individual 
politicians – often have weak accountability 
structures, within which politicians are largely 
unresponsive to the service delivery needs of 
their constituents. Our research shows, however, 
that politicians’ responsiveness to citizens is 
conditioned by how political party organisations 
operate within their constituencies, and by 
competition at both the constituency level and 
among local party workers. This is important: it 
shows that more politically dense and competitive 
environments cater better to citizens’ service 
delivery needs. 
Multiparty competition and dense political 
engagement have intrinsic value that can motivate 
elected representatives to deliver essential 
services to their voters, even where political 
accountability is weakly institutionalised, and 
where political parties tend to function around 
the appeal – often populist – of strong individual 
politicians. In other words, here is more evidence 
that politics and democracy matter for public 
service provision. 
These lessons may transfer to other urban 
contexts where clientelist party machines operate 
within weakly institutionalised, but politically 
competitive, contexts. What does this mean for 
institutional reforms in emerging democracies? 
We offer the following suggestions.
• It is important to experiment with the 
introduction of public reporting systems that 
provide information on service provision at 
the lowest level of the jurisdiction at which 
citizens elect provincial and national leaders. 
The information that is provided should be 
specific to the actions of politicians and 
resulting outcomes, so that citizens can 
evaluate the relative performance of different 
political competitors at the local level.
• There is a need to support institutional 
reforms that remove opacity in the assignment 
of functions between politicians and 
bureaucrats, and between higher and lower 
tiers of government. This will ensure that 
information about performance is clearly 
attributable at the local level, and that there is 
less scope for politicians to blame extraneous 
institutional factors for poor delivery.
• Reform programmes must include 
interventions that strengthen the long route 
of political accountability, as this is a critical 
component for getting essential services to 
people (as opposed to the ‘short route’ of 
social accountability). Bureaucratic reforms 
that are implemented in a non-competitive 
political environment may lack an important 
piece of the puzzle. 
• There is a need to support institutional 
reforms that map budgetary flows at the level 
of the lowest jurisdictions at which provincial 
and national politicians are elected, and to 
make this information public.
• The Election Commission of Pakistan should 
produce a white paper on the state of political 
competition, which should map the variations 
in electoral competition at the lowest level. The 
aim of this paper should be to provide public 
information for citizens and political parties, 
and to identify areas of low competition.
Politicians’ responsiveness to citizens is conditioned by how political party 
organisations operate within their constituencies, and by competition at 
both the constituency level and among local party workers
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1 Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Pakistan, and Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan. 
2 Institute of Development Studies, UK.
3 Harvard Kennedy School, USA.
4 The lower tier of local government in Pakistan.
5 Municipal services include street lights, garbage removal, the provision of garbage bins, modern sanitation, and drinking and 
piped water. Services are classified as ‘dysfunctional’ when respondents rated the quality of service that they have access to as 
being very poor or poor. They are classified as ‘functional’ when they rate the quality as being very excellent or good, and the 
remaining category is classified as ‘moderately functional’.
6 We use 2013 as our reference point as we were interested in mapping the changes in provision since the last general election, 
held in May 2013.
7 All our findings remain, even after we controlled them for a number of other factors that could potentially explain the difference 
in improvements across households (e.g. respondent demographics such as age, gender, education and income; the social 
centrality of the respondent within the community; the political participation, views and partisan politics of each respondent).
8 Pakistan has experienced intermittent military rule since independence in 1947, and consistent interventions against political 
parties during these regimes have not allowed parties to develop strong organisational structures. Pakistan’s most recent 
transition to democracy was in 2008. 
 References 
Khemani, S.; Dal Bó, E.; Ferraz, C.; Finan F. and 
Stephenson, C., with Odugbemi, A.; Thapa, D. and 
Abrahams, S. (2016) Making Politics Work for 
Development: Harnessing Transparency and Citizen 
Engagement, Policy Research Reports, Washington 
DC: World Bank
Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. (2007) Patrons, 
Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic 
Accountability and Political Competition, New York: 
Cambridge University Press
Przeworski, A.; Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (1999) 
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Vol. 
2, New York: Cambridge University Press
Stokes, S. (2006) ‘Do Informal Rules Make 
Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability 
in Argentina’, in G. Helmke and S. Levitsky (eds), 
Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from 
Latin America, Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press
World Bank (2003) World Development Report 
2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, 
Washington DC: World Bank
RESEARCH 
BRIEFING Competing to deliver? Political workers and service delivery in Pakistan
About this research briefing
This research briefing is based on a longer piece of forthcoming research on politics, voice and 
responsiveness in urban Pakistan. The study was carried out by researchers from the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), UK; the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Pakistan; Lahore 
University of Management Sciences, Pakistan; and Harvard Kennedy School, USA.
IDS requests due acknowledgement and quotes from this publication to be referenced as Cheema, A,; Khan 
Mohmand, S. and Liaqat, A. (2017) Competing to deliver? Political workers and service delivery in Pakistan, 
Making All Voices Count Research Briefing, Brighton: IDS 
About Making All Voices Count
Making All Voices Count is a programme working towards a world in which open, effective and participatory 
governance is the norm and not the exception. It focuses global attention on creative and cutting-edge 
solutions to transform the relationship between citizens and their governments. The programme is inspired 
by and supports the goals of the Open Government Partnership.
Making All Voices Count is supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA) and the Omidyar Network, and is implemented by a consortium consisting of Hivos, IDS and 
Ushahidi.
Research, Evidence and Learning component
The programme’s Research, Evidence and Learning component, managed by IDS, contributes to improving 
performance and practice, and builds an evidence base in the field of citizen voice, government responsiveness, 
transparency and accountability (T&A) and technology for T&A (Tech4T&A).
Web www.makingallvoicescount.org
Email info@makingallvoicescount.org
Twitter @allvoicescount
Front cover photo: Political workers from a constituency in urban Punjab. Credit: Khurram Rohale Asghar 
media team.
Disclaimer: This document has been produced with the financial support of the Omidyar Network, SIDA, UK 
aid from the UK Government, and USAID. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect 
the official policies of our funders.
This work is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
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